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I. INTRODUCTION
From the time that Robert Bork issued his first attack on the
Warren Court,1 originalism has belonged to political conservatives.
This interpretive theory, which holds that the understanding of the
Constitution at the time it was drafted and ratified controls its
contemporary meaning, has been regularly utilized by conservative
judges and politicians over the last two decades to question the
legitimacy of various (mostly liberal) Supreme Court decisions. 2
Given the liberal tilt of the legal academy, it is not suprising that
advocates of originalism constitute a minority of constitutional
scholars.3
Recently, a prominent constitutional theorist with unmistak-
ably liberal credentials announced his conversion to originalism.
Michael Perry, once a self-described non-originalist, now argues that
originalism is the only legitimate method of interpreting the
Constitution.4 Perry did not change his political commitments along
with his methodological ones, however; his recent work is an extended
argument against the "conservative originalism" advocated by Bork.
Like John Ely, who sought to defend the activist decisions of the
Warren Court against conservative attacks on their legitimacy,5 Perry
seeks to blunt more recent conservative criticism of the Court by
demonstrating that originalist interpretation need not foreclose broad
1. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J.
1 (1971).
2. See, for example, Robert Dole, speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors
(Apr. 19, 1996), excerpted in N.Y. Times A10 (Apr. 20, 1996); Edwin Meese III, Speech to the
American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted as The Supreme Court of the United States:
Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Roy. 455 (1986); William H. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
3. See, for example, Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (Harvard U., 1975); Lino A.
Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of 'Regime Principles" A Prescription for Government by
Judges, 26 S. Tex. L. J. 435 (1985); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988);
Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1987). For some prominent
critiques of originalism, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap, 1986); John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U., 1980); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980); Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983). For an ideologically diverse collection of position papers on consti-
tutional interpretation and adjudication, see Symposium, Originalism, Democracy, and the
Constitution, 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 237 (1996).
4. Compare Michael Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay ch. 6
(Oxford U., 1988), with Michael Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? ch. 3
(Oxford U., 1994).
5. See generally Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 73-75 (cited in note 3) (arguing that
Warren Court decisions opened up the political process).
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readings of the individual rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
Despite their considerable ideological differences, both Bork's
"conservative originalism" and Perry's less constrained "progressive
originalism" divide the process of understanding into cognitive and
normative aspects. The determination of the original meaning of the
Constitution is methodologically separated from the question of how
this predetermined meaning should be applied in a particular con-
temporary case.7 This places both Bork and Perry squarely in the
tradition of Romantic hermeneutics, which sought to overcome the
uncertainty and imprecision of textual interpretation by developing a
"science of interpretation" as epistemologically reliable as the meth-
ods of the natural sciences.
The Romantic hermeneutic tradition influenced American law
through the work of Francis Lieber, a German immigrant to the
United States who published a treatise on legal interpretation in
1839.8 Like contemporary originalists, Lieber exhibited the character-
istic Romantic anxiety over the uncertainty of interpretation, and
sought to develop a method that would guarantee the correctness of
interpretive meanings ascribed to legal texts by judges and lawyers s
In Truth and Method,1° German philosopher Hans-Georg
Gadamer argued that the presuppositions of the Romantic quest for
epistemological certainty in interpretation are inconsistent with how
human beings understand texts.1' Though it is not frequently cited in
American legal scholarship, Truth and Method has long been viewed
by continental and postmodern philosophers as the most important
6. See Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 9-10, 54-55 (cited in note 4) ("[The originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation does not entail... a small or passive judicial role; [it]
is not necessarily inconsistent with a judicial role as large or active as any apostle of 'the
Warren Cour ... could reasonably want.').
7. See Part II.
8. Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and
Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and Authorities (F.H. Thomas, 3d
ed. 1880). Lieber's treatise was recently republished with extensive commentary in 16 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1879 (1995).
9. See Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux, eds., Interpreting Law and Literature" A
Hermeneutic Reader ix (Northwestern U., 1988) (arguing that because interpretation "endeavors
to arrive at conclusions beyond the absolute sense of the text," judges and lawyers "must strive
the more anxiously to find out safe rules, to guide us on the dangerous path") (quoting Lieber,
Legal and Political Hermenuetics at 52-53 (cited in note 8)).
10. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Crossroad, 2d rev. ed. 1993).
11. See Part HI.
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work on textual interpretation published in this century. 12 Thus, the
more interesting question raised by Perry's conversion to originalism
is not whether he or Bork espouses the better version of the method,
but whether either (or any) version of originalism is a useful way to
investigate questions about the meaning of the Constitution in light of
Gadamer's argument.
I will argue that it is not. I first discuss Gadamer's point that
separation of the cognitive or "objective" meaning of a text from its
normative or "subjective" application is not consistent with the proc-
ess of understanding.13 Both Bork's and Perry's use of their respective
versions of originalism illustrates Gadamer's central point: that the
epistemological certainty in interpretation sought by separation of the
cognitive from the normative cannot be achieved.14 That theorists on
both the right and the left persist in their attempts to guarantee in-
terpretive meaning through "objective" methodologies like originalism
is evidence of the extent to which constitutional theory remains con-
fined by the questionable assumptions of the Romantic tradition. 15
Given the establishment of postmodernism as a legitimate, albeit
controversial, approach to legal theory, and the increasing influence of
postmoderism in American culture generally, I conclude with the
suggestion that originalism must engage postmodern criticism like
Truth and Method if it is to remain a viable theory of constitutional
interpretation.
II. ORIGINALIST METHOD
Bork's theory of originalism has its roots in a fundamental
question of American political theory: How can one reconcile the
majoritarianism of American democracy with the countermajoritari-
anism of judicial review? Declaration by the federal judiciary that an
act of an elected branch of government is unconstitutional is the over-
turning of the majority's political will by judges insulated from this
will by lifetime appointment. 6 Such judicial declarations can them-
selves be overturned only by assembling the difficult supermajorities
required to amend the Constitution. On the other hand, subjecting
12. See, for example, Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics 2 (Yale
U., 1994); Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method ix (Yale
U., 1985).
13. See Part Ill.
14. See Parts IV and V.
15. See Part VI.
16. Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 3 (cited in note 1).
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political minorities to unconstrained majority rule would inevitably
result in an unjust diminution in their liberty, for there are "some
areas of life in which the individual must be free of majority rule."'17
This seeming paradox in American democracy, whereby a relatively
few unelected judges have the power to thwart majority will as ex-
pressed in both Congress and the state legislatures, is known as the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty."18
How can judicial countermajoritarianism be justified in a de-
mocracy? Assuming that in a democracy the majority presumptively
rules, Bork maintains that judicial invalidation of majority actions is
legitimate only when such invalidation is rooted in a provision of the
Constitution that expressly insulates minorities from the conse-
quences of majority rule. 9 Otherwise, judges are not adjudicating
under the Constitution, but are merely asserting their own will:
Every clash between a minority claiming freedom and a majority claiming
power to regulate involves a choice between the gratifications of the two
groups. When the Constitution has not spoken, the Court will be able to find
no scale, other than its own value preferences, upon which to weigh the respec-
tive claims to pleasure.2 0
Since it is the majority's formal, self-conscious ratification of
the minority protection provisions set forth in the Constitution that
justifies judicial overturning of majority will, the meaning of these
provisions must be restricted to the "original understanding"-that is,
the understanding of the provisions held by the people at the time of
ratification.2 In any conflict between majority and minority, the
17. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 139 (Free Press, 1990). See also Bork, 47
Ind. L. J. at 3 (cited in note 1) ('[Tlhere are some areas of life a majority should not control.").
18. See, for example, Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics 16-18 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
19. Bork, Tempting of America at 150 (cited in note 17); Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 3, 10-11
(cited in note 1).
20. Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 9 (cited in note 1). See also Bork, Tempting of America at 265
(cited in note 17) ("The person who understands these issues and nevertheless continues to
judge constitutional philosophy by sympathy with its results must. .. admit that he is prepared
to sacrifice democracy in order that his moral views may prevail.... He believes in the triumph
of the will."); Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 10 (cited in note 1) ("Where the Constitution does not embody
the moral or ethical choice, the judge has no basis other than his own values upon which to set
aside the community judgment embodied in the statute.").
21. See Bork, Tempting of America at 4-5, 143-45, 351-53 (cited in note 17). See also
Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. Tex. L. J. 383, 389 (1985) C'[A] value-
choosing theory must give a satisfactory reason why it is legitimate for a court to impose a new
value on a majority against its wishes."). Bork does acknowledge the legitimacy of recognizing
so-called "derivative" constitutional rights like freedom of association, the possession of which is
essential to meaningful exercise of rights expressly enumerated in the constitutional text. Bork,
47 Ind. L. J. at 18 (cited in note 1).
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judge must derive from the original understanding of the Constitution
a rule or principle that resolves the conflict.22 No other interpretive
method, argues Bork, is consistent with democracy.23
Perry's originalism is also directed at the countermajoritarian
difficulty, though he is less explicit about this than Bork and uses a
somewhat different vocabulary. In Perry's view, the words of the
Constitution represent various "norms" or "directives."24 For Perry,
the meaning of a textual provision of the Constitution is the norm or
directive signified by the text: to "interpret" a constitutional provision
is merely to identify and articulate the norm or directive it repre-
sents. 25 The real question is whether the understanding of those who
drafted and ratified the text, or that of some more comtemporary
group, should be privileged in articulating the norm or directive em-
bodied within the provision. 26 Like Bork, Perry concludes that the
original understanding must be privileged, on the similar ground that
constitution-making is an intentional political act undertaken to bind
future governments.27 Thus, the Supreme Court may legitimately
enforce only those norms or directives signified by the constitutional
text as originally understood by its Framers and ratifiers: "It is
difficult to discern any justification... for the Court privileging any
understanding of a constitutional provision other than the original
understanding-for privileging, that is, any directive other than the
directive the provision was originally understood to communicate, the
directive the provision was ratified to establish."28
Although Perry and Bork both insist that the meaning of the
Constitution be defined by its original understanding, they diverge
Bork denies that originalism requires determination of the subjective intentions of the
Framers with respect to any constitutional provision: "[W]hat the ratifiers understood them-
selves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time would have understood
the words to mean.... The search is not for a subjective intention' Bork, Tempting of America
at 144 (cited in note 17). See also Kay, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 230 (cited in note 3) (calling for
"judges to apply the rules of the written constitution in the sense in which those rules were
understood by the people who enacted them").
22. See Bork, Tempting of America at 262, 352 (cited in note 17) ("Doctrine must be
shaped and reshaped to conform to the original ideas of the Constitution.").
23. Id. at 155; Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 3 (cited in note 1).
24. I have not attempted to synthesize Perry's and Bork's respective vocabularies into
third terms that encompass the meaning of both. In general, I understand Bork's originalist
"derivation" and "definition" of constitutional "principles" as equivalent to Perry's originalist
"interpretation" of constitutional "norms" or "directives," terms that Perry uses interchangeably.
25. Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 7-8, 28, 47-48 (cited in note 4). Because Perry's
definition of "interpretation" is somewhat different from the meaning of the word in ordinary
usage, I enclose the word in quotation marks whenever I intend Perry's meaning.
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id. at 29-31, 48.
28. Id. at 48.
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considerably on the procedure for applying this understanding in
particular cases. Bork maintains that the personal value choices of
judges must be excluded from the application as well as from the
derivation of constitutional principle.29 Applicative neutrality is
threatened if judges can articulate a principle derived from the
Constitution at any level of abstraction they choose. By expanding or
contracting the generality with which a principle is articulated,
judges can determine whether or not the principle applies to a par-
ticular case, thus covertly injecting personal values into the judicial
process. 30 As in the derivation of constitutional principle, Bork main-
tains that defining the original understanding guarantees value neu-
trality in the application of principle by requiring that the judge
"state the principle at the level of generality that the text and histori-
cal evidence warrant. 31 Although it is evident that Bork understands
derivation and application as distinct steps in the interpretive proc-
ess, it is also clear that for him the originalism of application seems to
follow from the originalism of derivation.
Not so with Perry. Again using a vocabulary slightly different
from Bork's, 32 Perry distinguishes constitutional "interpretation" from
constitutional "specification."33 Perry maintains that the constitu-
tional norms or directives identified by originalism are often indeter-
minate-so abstract that it is not immediately clear how, or even
whether, they should resolve a particular case or controversy to which
they appear relevant.3 4 Constitutional specification is the refinement
and clarification of indeterminate norms and directives in the process
of using them to resolve concrete disputes presented by actual cases.35
Whereas "interpretation" results in a statement of the "textual" mean-
ing of a constitutional provision, specification yields what Perry calls
29. Bork, Tempting of America at 143, 146 (cited in note 17); Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 7 (cited
in note 1).
30. Bork, Tempting of America at 146 (cited in note 17); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution,
Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 San Diego L. Rev. 823, 828-29 (1986).
31. Bork, Tempting of America at 149 (cited in note 17). See, for example, id. at 150
('Original understanding avoids the problem of the level of generality in equal protection
analysis by finding the level of generality that interpretation of the words, structure, and
history of the Constitution fairly supports").
32. Although Bork's "application" of principle is obviously intended to be more constrained
than Perry's "specification" of norms or directives, each performs the same function in its
respective methodology-that of adapting an abstract principle to a concrete situation.
33. Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 28, 35, 36 (cited in note 4).
34. Id. at 37. See, for example, id. at 116 (considering the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
35. Id. at 28, 37.
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the provision's "contextual" meaning.36 For Perry, "interpretation" is
descriptive and positivist-what directive does the text signify in light
of its original understanding?-while specification is an unambigu-
ously normative procedure, a "species of judgment"-how (if at all)
should an indeterminate originalist norm or directive resolve a par-
ticular constitutional case?37
Unlike Bork, Perry differentiates sharply between interpretive
methodology and judicial role. Perry maintains that to have estab-
lished originalism as the correct way to discern the meaning of the
Constitution is not to have established judicial "minimalism"--the
view that judges should be restrained in identifying and applying
constitutional norms: "[T]he originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation does not entail-it does not necessarily eventuate in-a
small or passive judicial role."3
Perry's argument that "originalism does not entail minimal-
ism" has two parts.3 9 First, history alone is often insufficient to de-
termine the "interpretive" meaning of the constitutional text, so that
there are usually two or more norms that an originalist judge plausi-
bly could ascribe to a constitutional provision.40 In this event, origi-
nalism itself does not instruct the judge how to choose between com-
peting plausible directives, and she thus may choose the less determi-
nate directive-the one that maximizes judicial discretion-while
remaining faithful to her originalist commitments. 41 The source of
judicial restraint in such a situation is not originalism, but
"interpretive minimalism," which is the view that judges should
choose the more determinate directive whenever a text plausibly can
be understood to represent more than one.42
Second, even when only one plausible "interpretive" meaning
exists for a provision of the Constitution, this meaning is often insuf-
ficient to determine the normative meaning of the text in a specific
situation, so that it is unclear how (if at all) the directive communi-
cated by the text should resolve a particular dispute. 43 Again, origi-
nalism does not dictate which of several plausible specifications of the
textual directive an originalist judge must choose in such a situation,
and an originalist judge remains free to choose the specification with
36. Id. at 35, 36.
37. Id. at 28, 75.
38. Id. at 55.
39. See id. at chs. 4 and 5.
40. Id. at 56, 75-76.
41. Id. at 58-59.
42. Id. at 84.
43. Id. at 56, 75.
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the greatest breadth and impact. Indeed, Perry argues that original-
ism only dictates how to "interpret" the constitutional text, and has
nothing whatsoever to do with specifying the constitutional meaning
identified by "interpretation":
[O]riginaism... is a position about the proper judicial approach to the inter-
pretive inquiry. It bears emphasis that originalism is not a position about the
proper judicial approach to the second of those inquiries: the normative in-
quiry, the inquiry into what shape to give, in a particular context, an indeter-
minate directive represented... by a particular provision of the constitutional
text.
44
As with "interpretation" of the constitutional text, the source of judi-
cial restraint in applying constitutional norms is not originalism, but
"normative minimalism"-the view that judges should defer to the
judgment of the political branches in specifying the meaning of consti-
tutional norms when they are concretized in particular situations or
controversies. 45
III. GADAMER'S CRITIQUE OF METHOD
A. Science, Kant, and Their Epistemological Challenge to
the Human Sciences
Despite their differences over the appropriate breadth of judi-
cial power to apply the original understanding in particular cases,
both Bork and Perry methodologically separate cognitive from norma-
tive interpretation. Both of them view determination of the original-
ist meaning of a constitutional text as an interpretive step prior to,
and distinct from, application of that meaning to a particular situ-
ation. Bork's argument, for example, assumes that the derivation of
constitutional principle from the original understanding is separate
from the subsequent application of that principle to the facts of a
particular case." Perry's differentiation of interpretation and specifi-
cation results in an identical separation of the cognitive and the nor-
44. Id. at 28.
45. Id. at 87-90.
46. "Having derived and defined the principle to be applied, [the judge] must apply it con-
sistently and without regard to his sympathy or lack of sympathy with the parties before him."
Bork, Tempting of America at 151 (cited in note 17). See also id. at 143 (arguing that for judges
meaningfully to be bound by law, the law must have "a meaning independent of our own
desires").
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mative, made even sharper because specification does not share origi-
nalist premises with "interpretation" as derivation and application do
in Bork's methodology.47 Thus, both Perry and Bork assume that the
original understanding has an existence apart from the cases to which
it is applied.
In Truth and Method, Gadamer criticized the distinction be-
tween cognitive and normative interpretation, the very distinction on
which both Bork's and Perry's respective accounts of constitutional
interpretation depend. Truth and Method is a lengthy treatise the
intricately related parts of which cannot be adequately summarized
here.4 Its general target is the Enlightenment idea that knowledge
about the world lies exclusively within the domain of scientific
methodology.49 According to Gadamer, the essence of Enlightenment
thought was its vigorous criticism of the influence of tradition and
dogmatic authority in the search for truth.50 The noticeable result of
this criticism was the abandonment of authority and
tradition-indeed, of all "pre-judgments" or prejudices-as the
principal means of identifying truth and the installment of reason in
their place:
In general, the Enlightenment tends to accept no authority and to decide
everything before the judgment seat of reason. Thus the written tradition of
Scripture, like any other historical document, can claim no absolute validity;
the possible truth of the tradition depends on the credibility that reason ac-
cords it. It is not tradition but reason that constitutes the ultimate source of
all authority.
51
47. "[T]he problem [of constitutional interpretation] is deciding what the text means in
two senses: first, deciding what directive the text, as originally understood, represents, and,
second, deciding what that directive means, what it requires, in the context of the conflict to be
resolved.... A judge simply cannot do the latter until she has first done the former." Perry,
Constitution in the Courts at 35 (cited in note 4). See also id. at 37 ("Before the directive the text
was meant to represent can be 'understood'rapplied'... the directive the text was meant to
represent must be identified. Before the normative inquiry, the interpretive inquiry.").
48. For a concise summary of Gadamer's argument, see Grondin, Philosophical
Hermeneutics ch. VI (cited in note 12).
49. See Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics at 17, 28, 41 (cited in note 12). Gadamer
states:
Ultimately, it has always been known that the possibilities of rational proof and in-
struction do not fully exhaust the sphere of knowledge....
We... must laboriously make our way back into this tradition by first showing
the difficulties that result from the application of the modern concept of method to the
human sciences. Let us therefore consider how this tradition became so impoverished
and how the human sciences' claim to know something true came to be measured by a
standard foreign to it-namely the methodical thinking of modern science.
Gadamer, Truth and Method at 23-24 (cited in note 10).
50. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 270-72 (cited in note 10).
51. Id. at 272.
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Scientific method exemplified this Enlightenment "prejudice
against prejudice."52 The distinctive attribute of scientific method is
its rigorous separation of the investigator from the object of investiga-
tion.53 The validity of the results of scientific investigation is not
understood to depend on either the identity of the investigator or the
consistency of the results with conventional wisdom about the subject
matter. Rather, the validity of the results depends on the validity of
the procedure used to generate them. "What makes modern scholar-
ship scientific," argues Gadamer, "is precisely the fact that it objecti-
fies tradition and methodically eliminates the influence of the inter-
preter and his time on understanding.... [A]ccording to this view,
science claims to remain independent of all subjective applications by
reason of its method."54 In other words, a valid method purports to
objectify the process of obtaining knowledge by yielding true results
regardless of who employs the method. 55 Consequently, method was
thought to have freed scientific investigation from the biases of tradi-
tion and authority against which Enlightenment thinkers so vigor-
ously fought.56
The emergence of method in the natural sciences had ominous
consequences for the "moral" or "human" sciences: law, literature,
and theology. In the human sciences, knowledge had long been
thought to depend on the cultivation of a proper sense of community,
judgment, and taste. 57 For example, nineteenth-century German sci-
52. Id. at 270-71.
53. See id. at 4 ("The use of the inductive method is ... free from all metaphysical as-
sumptions and remains perfectly independent of how one conceives of the phenomena that one
is observing.").
54. Id. at 333. Weinsheimer adds:
A prejudice may be quite correct, but the Enlightenment considered all prejudices (that
is, all pre-judgments predetermined by tradition) as false because it was willing to call
true only those judgments that had received the imprimatur of method. The only cer-
tainty derived from methodological certification, and any certainty that had not passed
the test of doubt was deemed not only uncertain but at least provisionally false.
Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermieneutics at 168 (cited in note 12)
55. Weinsheimer points out that this view of science as neutral and value-free
investigation of the world is no longer considered tenable by most contemporary historians and
philosophers of science. See Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics at 15-32 (cited in note 12).
See also Robert P. Crease, The Play of Nature Experimentation as Performance (Indiana U.,
1993); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U. of Chicago, 2d ed. 1970).
56. See Gadamer, Truth and Method at 182 (cited in note 10) ("[T]he enemy against which
the new science of nature has to assert itself is the knowledge gained from Scripture and
authorities. By contrast, the essence of the new science consists in its special methodology,
which leads through mathematics and reason to an insight into what is intelligible in itself.").
57. Id. at 19-40. This sense was thought to be achieved through Bildung, a complex
German concept defined by Herder as the "rising up to humanity through culture." Id. at 10.
According to Gadamer, Bildung is "intimately associated with the idea of culture and designates
primarily the properly human way of developing one's natural talents and capacities." Id. See
1997] 623
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entist Hermann Helmholtz described knowledge in the human sci-
ences as the result of "an unconscious process" requiring "a kind of
tact" as well as "a well-stocked memory and the acceptance of authori-
ties."58 The true meaning of a text was not understood to depend on
proper application of an impersonal method. To the contrary, it was
precisely a developed aesthetic sense in the interpreter that was
thought to enable the discernment of a text's true meaning.59 In
short, the human sciences were a way of knowing built upon ability
rather than method.60
At the same time that method was emerging as the means of
discovering truth and knowledge, Kant was demonstrating the subjec-
tive dimension of aesthetics in his Critique of Judgment. Kant estab-
lished that the knowledge given by aesthetics constituted knowledge
of the interpreter, not knowledge of the artistic or textual object,
thereby divesting aesthetic sense, and by extension the human sci-
ences, of authority as a way of knowing the world, and leaving epis-
temology to the natural sciences. 61 Whereas the humanistic concepts
of judgment and taste "had previously possessed a cognitive function,"
writes Jean Grondin, Kant's critique "subjectivized and aestheticized
judgment and taste and (what amounts to the same thing) denied it
any cognitive value. Whatever did not measure up to the standards of
the objective and methodical natural sciences, was thereafter consid-
ered merely 'subjective' and 'aesthetic'-that is, excommunicated from
the realm of hard knowledge."2
The objectification of knowledge by method and the
subjectification of aesthetics by Kant combined to make the human
also Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics at 69 (cited in note 12) ('Originating in medieval
mysticism, Bildung first suggests cultivating the image... of God in man; and the post-
Renaissance usage of the term retains the sense of full, almost supernatural, realization of
human potential.").
58. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 5 (cited in note 10).
59. See id. at 27-29 (describing the Pietists' belief that scriptural and all other knowledge
stemmed from the sensus communis); id. at 37-38 (elaborating the historical concept of taste as
a "mode" or "way of knowing").
60. See id. at 31 ("[Judgment] cannot be taught in the abstract but only practiced from
case to case, and is therefore more an ability like the senses. It is something that cannot be
learned, because no demonstration from concepts can guide the application of rules.").
61. Id. at 40-43, 97; Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics at 65-66, 81 (cited in note 12).
Some confusion arises over the fact that Kant believed the aesthetic senses were
"subjective"-that is, they constituted knowledge of the interpreter rather than knowledge of
the work of art-yet "universal"--they functioned in the same way in every person. As
Gadamer points out, this "universality of taste" is not the same as "empirical universality."
While the "universality of taste" does tell something about the artistic object, it does so only
through the interpreter. See Gadamer, Truth and Method at 37 (cited in note 10).
62. Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics at 109-10 (cited in note 12).
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sciences appear wholly inadequate as a means of discovering truth.63
For the human sciences to retain their status as sources of knowledge
in this intellectual environment, they needed a general method of
interpretation modeled after the methods used in the natural
sciences. 64 A general method, it was thought, would put the insights
gained from interpretation in the human sciences on the same
epistemological footing as the results of investigation in the natural
sciences.65 The development of such a method was the principal
preoccupation of Romantic hermeneutics in the nineteenth century. 66
B. Heidegger, Gadamer, and the "Problem of Application"
The ontological premises of the Romantic impulse to develop a
science of interpretation were challenged by Martin Heidegger in
Being and Time.6 7 Heidegger rejected as "superficial" and "formal"
the separation of subject and object that forms the principal premise
of the scientific method.68 Heidegger argued instead that human
beings have a constant, prior, and inevitable involvement with those
things in the world which they seek to understand. 69 Any effort at
63. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 5, 271 (cited in note 10); id. at 84 ("The shift in the
ontological definition of the aesthetic toward the concept of aesthetic appearance has its theo-
retical basis in the fact that the domination of the scientific model of epistemology leads to
discrediting all the possibilities of knowing that lie outside this new methodology tfiction'!]."
(brackets in original)). Gadamer continues: "Is there to be no knowledge in art? Does not the
experience of art contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but
just as certainly is not inferior to it? This can hardly be recognized if, with Kant, one measures
the truth of knowledge by the scientific concepts of knowledge and reality." Id. at 97.
64. Id. at 3-4, 6-7. Some Romantics, such as Droysen, argued that although the human
sciences needed a methodology to establish their epistemological credentials, such a methodol-
ogy need not be modeled on natural science. Id. at 6. Others, such as Dilthey, argued for the
epistemological independence of the human sciences, but somewhat paradoxically remained
strongly committed to the epistemological model of method in the natural sciences. Dilthey
thus argued that the human sciences required a method distinct from scientific method, yet
modelled his human sciences method on the methods of the natural sciences. Id. at 7-8.
65. See Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics at 6, 110 (cited in note 12).
66. See id. at ch. IV.
67. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Harper & Row, 1962).
68. Id. at 86-87. See also Allen Thiher, Words in Reflection: Modern Language Theory
and Postrnodern Fiction 38 (U. of Chicago 1984) ("Being and Time seeks to show that our
experience of the world is not based on any subject-object dichotomy.").
69. See Heidegger, Being and Time at 190-91 (cited in note 67) ("[When something
within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvemenet
which is disclosed in our understanding of the world"). See also id. at 89 ("When Dasein
['Being" or "Being-there"] directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow
first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary
kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which
belong to a world already discovered."); Thiher, Words in Reflection at 39 (cited in note 68)
('Dasein-being-there-stresses by its form that man is always already present in the world and
not separated from it as mind from matter or subject from object.").
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understanding is affected by the weight and influence of this prior
involvement. When we try to understand something, we cannot help
but "project" certain interpretive possibilities onto what we seek to
understand as the result of our prior involvement in the world. At the
same time, these possibilities are themselves conditioned by the way
in which interpretive possibilities have been projected in the past.70
These projections of meaning constitute what Heidegger called the
"fore-structure of understanding."7 For Heidegger, interpretation in
any given context consists of working out the possibilities of meaning
implicit in this fore-structure. 72 The point is nicely summarized by
Grondin:
[lit is not the case that first there are naked things "out there" which are sub-
sequently given a certain coloring by our "subjective" and circumspective un-
derstanding. On the contrary, what is primarily there is precisely our in-
volvement in the world, which takes the form of interpretive
projects.... Correlative to the factical and therefore fundamentally projective
forestructure of understanding is that it always finds itself within pregiven
perspectives that guide its expectations of meaning.
73
Elaborating the hermeneutical implications of Heidegger's
fore-structure of understanding, Gadamer seeks to show that under-
standing the meaning of texts in the human sciences is precisely the
result of this fore-structure. Understanding occurs as a result, not of
the separation of human beings from the texts they seek to under-
stand, but of their unavoidable prior involvement with such texts:
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in
the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the
text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out
70. See Heidegger, Being and Time at 184-85 (cited in note 67). See also Georgia Warnke,
Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason 38 (Polity, 1987) ("[The past acquires its
meaning in light of present experiences and anticipations while the meaning of the present and
anticipation of the future are conditioned by the way in which the past has been understood.").
71. Heidegger, Being and Time at 151-52 (cited in note 67).
72. Id. at 188-89.
73. Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics at 95 (cited in note 12). Grondin states else-
where:
According to Heidegger, Dasein already finds itself immersed in possibilities of under-
standing, that is, more or less conscious projects whose function it is to forestall a po-
tentially threatening course of events. In order to stay afloat in this world in which we
are and feel "thrown into," our understanding clings to different possibilities of being
and behaving that represent as many interpretive, caring or "fore-caring".. . anticipa-
tions on the world. Before we become aware of it, we find ourselves entangled in histori-
cal perspectives and ways of understanding the world (and thus ourselves since we are
essentially, following Heidegger, "beings-in-the-world").
Jean Grondin, Sources of Hermeneutics 51-52 (State U. of New York, 1995)
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this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he
penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there. 74
The conceptual heart of Gadamer's argument is a section enti-
tled "The Hermeneutic Problem of Application." 75  Gadamer here
maintains that "understanding always involves something like apply-
ing the text to be understood to the interpreter's present situation.."76
For Gadamer, there is no such thing as understanding the abstract
meaning of a text-that is, the text's meaning apart from the situ-
ation in which it is to be applied. For Gadamer, the meaning of a text
is always already shaped by the tradition in which it is embed-
ded-those situations in which the text has previously been ap-
plied-and its apparent relevance to the problem faced by the inter-
preter.
Consider, for example, the question whether Huckleberry Finn
is a racist text. As Georgia Warnke has pointed out, this "is a ques-
tion posed from a contemporary point of view."77 Questions of racism
can only arise in a society which holds to the ideal that race ought to
be irrelevant to judgments about a person's moral worth. Thus,
whether particular books or other works were "racist" could not have
been asked in the nineteenth century, which generally believed that
African Americans were "naturally" inferior. 78 Moreover, one cannot
simply read Huckleberry Finn and determine its meaning apart from
the question whether this meaning would now be considered racist,
because the question conditions the reading, and thus the meaning. 79
In short, the fore-structure of understanding means that a text is
understood only when it is applied in a particular situation.80
In introducing his argument for the unity of understanding
and application, Gadamer draws a helpful analogy between textual
74. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 267 (cited in note 10). Gadamer adds:
Just as the recipient of a letter understands the news that it contains and first sees
things with the eyes of the person who wrote the letter-i.e., considers what he writes as
true, and is not trying to understand the writer's peculiar opinions as such-so also do
we understand traditionary texts on the basis of expectations of meaning drawn from
our own prior relation to the subject matter.
Id. at 294.
75. Id. at 307-11.
76. Id. at 308.
77. Warnke, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason at 96 (cited in note 70).
78. See Robin West, Narrative, Authority, and Law 128-29 (U. of Michigan, 1993) (stating
that given the pervasive nineteenth-century view that African Americans were morally inferior
as a group, the question what African Americans did to merit condemnation "is not just
unanswerable" but "unaskable").
79. Warnke, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason at 96 (cited in note 70).
80. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 309 (cited in note 10).
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understanding and the identification of the good in Aristotelian eth-
ics. Aristotle constructed an ethics that defined the good in terms of
human action. Plato's ethics, in contrast, sought to identify the good
through metaphysics.81 In Aristotelian ethics, the goal of moral
knowledge is to ascertain what a particular situation requires of the
human actor.8 2 In other words, ethics is not a matter of applying an
abstract rule in a particular situation, of "applying something to
something," in David Hoy's words, "but is rather a question of perceiv-
ing what is at stake in a given situation."83 This conception of ethics
has two important implications. First, knowledge that is not or can-
not be applied in a concrete situation is ethically meaningless. 84
Second, moral knowledge cannot be conceptually separated from the
concrete situation out of which such knowledge arises.85 This is true
because moral knowledge is not objective, but experiential; it is the
kind of knowledge yielded by one's experience of the concrete situ-
ation.8 6
Gadamer maintains that legal interpretation exemplifies the
identity of understanding and application illustrated by Aristotelian
ethics. For Gadamer, it makes no sense to speak in terms of abstract
legal meaning; the interpreter of a law understands that law only in
terms of the cases in which the law has been and is being applied.8 7
Accordingly, legal meaning does not exist outside of the concrete
situations in which law has been and must be applied. To be under-
stood at all, the legal text "must be understood at every moment, in
every concrete situation, in a new and different way. Understanding
81. Id. at 312.
82. Id. at 313.
83. David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle Literature, History, and Philosophical
Hermeneutics 58 (U. of California, 1978).
84. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 313 (cited in note 10). 'Moral knowledge can never be
knowable in advance like knowledge that can be taught." Id. at 321.
85. "What is right, for example, cannot be fully determined independently of the situation
that requires a right action from me." Id. at 317. See also id. ("The task of making a moral
decision is that of doing the right thing in a particular situation-i.e., seeing what is right
within the situation and grasping it.").
86. Id. at 322. See also id. at 314 ("[Moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly
not objective knowledge-i.e., the knower is not standing over against a situation that he
merely observes; he is directly confronted with what he sees. It is something that he has to
do").
87. Id. at 325. See id. at 309 ("A law does not exist in order to be understood historically,
but to be concretized in its legal validity by being interpreted."). Scriptural interpretation is
another exemplar. See Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics at 185-86 (cited in note 12)
('Law and Scripture cannot be understood merely aesthetically or merely historically because
their claim on the present, their claim to be applicable, is part of what they are.").
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here is always application."88 Again, Warnke gives a helpful example:
If one wants to determine whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits
wire-taps, one has to know how the Amendment has been applied in
previous cases. At the same time, the understanding of an "illegal
search" under the Fourth Amendment will be affected by the deter-
mination whether wire-taps are considered illegal. "We thus do not
have a purely exegetical knowledge of the meaning of an unlawful
search which we can then apply to wire-tapping; rather, our knowl-
edge of what an unlawful search is already involves application."89 In
Gadamer's view, therefore, there is no difference between "cognitive"
meaning-what does a legal text mean?-and "normative" mean-
ing-how should this textual meaning be applied in a particular
case?90 Meaning always-and only-arises out of application.
IV. PERRY'S PROBLEM WITH APPLICATION
Given Bork's open disdain for interdisciplinary legal scholar-
ship,91 one should not be surprised to find that he makes no attempt
to engage the arguments of Truth and Method, or of hermeneutics
generally. Perry, however, does attempt to harmonize his account of
constitutional interpretation with Truth and Method, denying that
the distinction between "understanding" and "application" criticized
by Gadamer is the same as Perry's distinction between
"interpretation" and specification. In Perry's view, the need for
"interpretation" is simply a consequence of the fact that the meaning
of some constitutional provisions is not obvious; some interpretive
work will be required to identify the norm or directive signified by the
text.92 Perry sees Gadamerian understanding/application as being
88. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 308-09 (cited in note 10). See also id. at 329 (The
work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific case-i.e., it is a work of applica-
tion.").
89. Warnke, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason at 95-96 (cited in note 70). See also
Hoy, Critical Circle at 54 (cited in note 83) ('Since understanding is always embedded in a
situation, the problem is not one of fitting preconceived notions to a situation, but of seeing in
the situation what is happening and, most important, what is to be done.").
90. See Warnke, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason at 95 (cited in note 70) (maintaining
that Gadamer views "exegetical" interpretation-attempting to ascertain the meaning of a text
apart from any potential applications-and "dogmatic" interpretation-interpreting a text
according to a settled or traditional meaning-as essentially the same).
91. See Bork, Tempting of America at 134, 207 (cited in note 17) (lamenting that to under-
stand modern legal scholarship "it would be necessary to read widely in moral philosophy,
hermeneutics, deconstructionism, Marxism, and who-knows-what-will-come-nex').
92. Perry states:
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part of constitutional specification-the process of deciding how the
already-determined cognitive meaning of a constitutional text should
be effectuated in a specific situation.9 3 He purports to agree with
Gadamer that understanding and application are the same, but
nevertheless insists that in some cases the constitutional text must be
"interpreted" before it can be applied: "Before the directive the text
was meant to represent can be 'understood'/'applied'-which, pace
Gadamer, is not two moves, but one-the directive the text was meant
to represent must be identified. Before the normative inquiry, the
interpretive inquiry."9 4
Although Perry attempts to reconcile his methodological sepa-
ration of cognitive and normative meaning with Gadamer's critique,
identifying "the directive the text was meant to represent" apart from
the situation in which this directive is to be applied is precisely the
kind of decontextualized exegetical procedure that Gadamer rejects as
inconsistent with how human beings understand texts. Gadamer
criticized this procedure in the work of Emilio Betti, a twentieth
century Italian legal philosopher who wrote in the Romantic herme-
neutical tradition. Betti, like Perry, argued that the determination of
cognitive meaning and normative meaning are separate steps in the
[S]ome legal texts-not all, but some-are, to the Court, initially unintelligible (opaque,
vague, ambiguous, etc.), in the sense that it is not initially clear to the Court what norm
or directive the text represents or, pace originalism, was meant to represent. If it is not
clear to the Court what directive a legal text was meant to represent, the Court must
translate or decode the text: The Court must identify, or try to, the directive the text
was meant to represent.
Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 37 (cited in note 4).
93. Perry comments:
[Specification] presupposes that there is no difference between understanding the con.
textual meaning of a legal norm or directive and "applying" the norm, bringing it to bear,
in the case at hand; to do the latter is to establish the contextual meaning of the norm
(by specifying the norm).
Id. at 37. Elsewhere Perry insists on a distinction between specification of an indeterminate
constitutional norm and "application" of a determinate one:
Whereas the process of applying a determinate directive is essentially deductive, the
process of specifying an indeterminate directive is essentially nondeductive. A specifi-
cation "of a principle for a specific class of cases is not a deduction from it, nor a discov-
ery of some implicit meaning; it is the act of setting a more concrete and categorical re-
quirement in the spirit of the principle, and guided both by a sense of what is practically
realizable (or enforceable), and by a recognition of the risk of conflict with other princi-
ples or values."
Id. at 75 (quoting Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction after Deconstructiow" A Response to CLS, 10
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 539, 548 (1990)). Since Perry insists that an indeterminate directive must
first be "interpreted" before it can be specified in a particular context, it is likely that he
understands "application" to include only the enforcement of a determinate directive. See
Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 167 (cited in note 4) ("To specify a contextually indetermi-
nate directive is one thing. To enforce ('apply') a contextually determinate directive-a directive
already specified in the relevant context-is something else.").
94. Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 37 (cited in note 4).
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interpretive process. 95  Betti, again like Perry, also argued that the
cognitive meaning initially communicated by a legal text will often be
too vague or ambiguous to resolve the legal conflicts presented by a
particular case. In this event, Betti maintained that the cognitive
meaning would need to be elaborated so that it could be profitably
applied to specific situations.96 In short, for both Betti and Perry legal
interpretation requires identification of the cognitive meaning of a
law with sufficient specificity that the law's normative meaning can
be clarified subsequently by applying the cognitive meaning to the
facts of the case at hand.
Gadamer suggests that the attempt to separate methodologi-
cally the cognitive from the normative meaning of a text is a conse-
quence of the influence of Romantic hermeneutics, particularly the
work of Friedrich Schleiermacher. The Pietist tradition97 of scriptural
95. Emilio Betti, 2 Teoria generale della interpretazione § 54 at 802-04 (Giuliano Crif6, ed.,
Giuffr& 1955). See generally Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics at 127 (cited in note 12);
Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger,
and Gadamer 58 (Northwestern U., 1969); David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law:
Hernieneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 136, 137 (1985).
Teoria generale is a two-volume treatise which attempted to fulfill the Romantic dream of
developing an epistemologically sound "science of interpretation." It has not been translated
into English. A summary of the main points of the treatise appeared in German in 1962 as part
of an essay by Betti providing a general critique of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics. This essay
was subsequently translated into English. See Emilio Betti, Hertneneutics as the General Meth-
odology of the Geisteswissenschaften [Human Sciences] (J.C.B. Mohr, 1962), in Joseph Bleicher,
Contemporary Herneneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique 51 (Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1980). Where they exist, I give parallel English citations to Betti's essay.
In addition, Betti's work is discussed in a number of secondary English sources. See, for
example, Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics at 125-29 (cited in note 10); Palmer,
Interpretation Theory at 46-59 (cited in this note); Hoy, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 137-41 (cited in this
note). See also E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation xii (Yale U., 1967) (acknowledging the
influence of Betti and Teoria generale on Hirsch's work).
96. See Betti, 2 Teoria generale § 54 at 804, 807-08, 822 (cited in note 95); Betti,
Hernieneutics, in Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics at 83 (cited in note 95). Betti writes:
IThe task of extracting from law (or custom) the decisional holding suited to the factual
situation submitted to judgment normally comprises two successive operations, different
from but logically connected to each other: a) the ascertainment of the existing legisla-
tive or customary norms and of the categories of interests protected by them; and, where
this does not sufficiently and unambiguously determine the precept to be applied, b) the
further elaboration of the holding required for the decision of the case.
Betti, 2 Teoria generale § 55 at 819 (cited in note 95) (author's translation).
97. The Pietists comprised a school of eighteenth century interpretive thought which held
that biblical texts had dual meanings: a literal, semantic meaning, and a transcending spiritual
meaning. Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Century Herieneutics 38 (Yale U., 1974). Johann Jacob Rambach, for example,
maintained that "[tihe inspiring activity of the Spirit is clearly distributed equally and evenly
over the sacred pages and the hearts and minds of those who attend them properly," so that one
ought to be able to discern "a spiritual sense above the ordinary grammatical and logical senses
in at least some of the sacred words." Id. The Pietists believed that this spiritual meaning of
the Bible was available to all those who read the Bible devoutly and with the Holy Spirit, rather
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:613
interpretation originally divided the process of understanding into
three moments or "subtleties": "understanding," the immediate grasp
of the meaning of a text; "interpretation," the explication of a text
when its meaning is not immediately clear; and "application," in
which the understood or explicated text is applied to a particular
situation. 98 For the Pietists, understanding was the normal conse-
quence of reading a text, whereas interpretation was necessary when
textual meaning was not immediately clear.99
Schleiermacher erased the distinction between understanding
and interpretation, arguing that misunderstanding, not understand-
ing, is the usual consequence of reading a text. 100 In other words, the
obvious or apparent meaning of the text could not be taken uncriti-
cally as its true meaning. To the contrary, this "natural" meaning
generally must be assumed incorrect. Interpretation determines the
correct meaning of a text, and thus is a necessary condition for under-
standing.101
The Romantic fusion of understanding and interpretation
made application seem unconnected to understanding. 102  The
Romantics viewed the moment of application as occurring "after"
interpretation/understanding, a "post facto supplement" to it.1°3 Since
for Gadamer understanding always involves application, he regards
understanding, interpretation, and application as comprising one
unified process. 10 4 Thus, "discovering the meaning of a legal text and
discovering how to apply it in a particular legal instance are not two
separate actions, but one unitary process."10 5
than through the lens of tradition or philosophy. Id. at 158. Their belief in a "higher" spiritual
sense "above" the semantic sense of the Bible required that the Pietists engage in interpretation
to uncover and articulate this higher meaning when it was not clear from semantics.
98. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 307 (cited in note 10).
99. Id. at 182-83.
100. Id. at 179, 184-85.
101. See Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Herineneutics at 185 (cited in note 12) ("Understanding
is never immediate but always mediated by interpretation; and since this is always the case,
understanding is indivisible from interpretation."). See also Gadamer, Truth and Method at 307
(cited in note 10) ("Interpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to understanding;
rather, understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form of
understanding.").
102. Hoy, Critical Circle at 53 (cited in note 83).
103. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 308 (cited in note 10).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 310. See also Hoy, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 139 (cited in note 95) ("Understanding is
always already interpretation, Gadamer maintains, and interpretation is always already appli-
cation.").
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Gadamer expressly disputes the phenomenological possibility
of Betti's separation of cognitive interpretation from normative appli-
cation:
Our line of thought prevents us from dividing the hermeneutic problem in
terms of the subjectivity of the interpreter and the objectivity of the meaning
to be understood. This would be starting from a false antithesis that cannot be
resolved even by recognizing the dialectic of subjective and objective. To dis-
tinguish between a normative function and a cognitive one is to separate what
clearly belong together. The meaning of a law that emerges in its normative
application is fundamentally no different from the meaning reached in under-
standing a text.106
A cognitive/normative separation implicitly denies the exis-
tence of the Heideggarian fore-structure of understanding' 07-that is,
it does not recognize that when we seek to understand a text, our
prior experience in the world causes us to approach the text with
certain expectations of meaning that are themselves historically con-
tingent. This prior experience thus channels and narrows the possi-
ble meanings that the text will yield. 08 In Gadamer's view, there is
no "objective" cognitive meaning distinct from the "subjective" norma-
tive concerns of the interpreter. Understanding a text does not de-
pend solely on clarifying its semantic meaning, but also on the inter-
preter's understanding of the subject matter to which the text is situ-
ated, how this tradition has previously interpreted this text as well as
other relevant texts, and the methods and themes current within the
tradition.109 For Gadamer, the interpreting "subject" cannot be mean-
ingfully separated from the textual "object,110 as Betti's cogni-
tive/normative distinction, Perry's "interpretation"/specification dis-
tinction, and Bork's derivation/application distinction all imply. Any
approach that insists on such separation is not consistent with
Gadamer's account of human understanding.
106. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 311 (cited in note 10). See also id. at 310 ("[W]e
cannot avoid the conclusion that [Betti's] suggested distinction between cognitive, normative,
and reproductive interpretation has no fundamental validity, but all three constitute one uni-
tary phenomenon.").
107. See notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
108. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 300 (cited in note 10) ("If we are trying to understand
a historical phenomenon from the historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical
situation, we are always already affected by history. It determines in advance both what seems
to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation... .
109. Hoy, Critical Circle at 53 (cited in note 83).
110. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 311 (cited in note 10).
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V. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ORIGINALIST METHOD
Gadamer's argument that cognitive and normative interpreta-
tion cannot be separated is not trivial. It attacks the foundation of all
originalist methodology, be it progressive or conservative, ultimately
calling into question whether "originalism" is phenomenologically
possible. Originalism distinguishes itself as an interpretive method
by differentiating and privileging the meaning intended by the author
from all other possible meanings. Bork, for example, repeatedly con-
tends that the only way that judges can be said to be bound by law is
if they interpret the Constitution according to its original understand-
ing. Those who contend that the Constitution must be interpreted
according to contemporary conceptions of morality and justice are
dismissed as heretics who purposefully distort or ignore the meaning
of the constitutional text to suit their own political agendas., Perry
similarly believes that non-originalism is afflicted by relativism,
though he makes the point in subtler fashion. Perry characterizes the
originalist question as, "What directive does this provision, as origi-
nally understood, represent?," whereas non-originalism asks, "What
directive does this provision, as understood by X, represent?"" 2 If X is
the interpreter, then no constraint external to this interpreter is
evident.
For Gadamer, what the constitutional text meant to the
Framers and their contemporaries, and what it means to us in the
light of contemporary notions of morality and justice, are simply dif-
ferent dimensions of the same question."3 Whenever originalists, or
anyone else, seek to understand a textual provision of the
Constitution, they approach it with a contemporary case in mind, a
present question that needs an answer. Every such provision has a
history of past understandings/applications (for Gadamer these are, of
course, synonymous). The task of the judge or other interpreter of the
Constitution is to work back to the origin, examining the history of
how the provision has come to be understood, its constitutional
"tradition," from the standpoint of the present case." 4 This examina-
111. Bork, Tempting of America at 5-7 (cited in note 17).
112. Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 33 (cited in note 4).
113. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 327 (cited in note 10). See Hoy, Critical Circle at 51-
52 (cited in note 83).
114. Gadamer states:
It is true that the jurist is always concerned with the law itself, but he determines its
normative content in regard to the given case to which it is to be applied. In order to
determine this content exactly, it is necessary to have historical knowledge of the
original meaning, and only for this reason does the judge concern himself with the
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tion elaborates the constitutional tradition so as to include in it the
answer to the question posed by the case at hand.
In this process-which Gadamer describes metaphorically as
the "fusion" of past and present horizons" 5-the tradition does not
function as a static rule from which one logically deduces a conclusion
in the present. To the contrary, it is through the tradition that the
past and the present exert mutual interpretive pressure when the
attempt to understand is made.116 The influence of tradition on the
present is obvious, but it must be noted that tradition itself is
changed as the result of being extended or reformulated in response to
a present question. Application of the tradition to the case not only
makes the case understandable in terms of the tradition, but causes
the tradition to be understood differently as the result of its applica-
tion in the case.117
The only understanding that can be had of a constitutional text
is that of an interpreter approaching the history of the provision from
the standpoint of a present question. Consequently, "the present
context is not really separated from the original context. Both are
joined by an intervening tradition.""8 Present interpreters always
approach texts from the past with a view to understanding the origi-
nal context of these texts for present purposes."19 The meaning of the
constitutional text is thus neither merely what the Framers and their
contemporaries understood it to mean, nor merely what we in the
present understand it to mean, but both.120
historical value that the law has through the act of legislation. But he cannot let
himself be bound by what, say, an account of the parliamentary proceedings tells him
about the intentions of those who first passed the law. Rather, he has to take account of
the change in circumstances and hence define afresh the normative function of the law.
Gadamer, Truth and Method at 326-27 (cited in note 10).
115. Id. at 306.
116. Id. at 306-07.
117. See id. CIn the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs-which
means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously superseded."). See also
Hoy, Critical Circle at 54 (cited in note 83) (Since the present situation is never exactly the
same as the situations of the previous interpretations .... even the judge cannot merely repeat
a precedent. In order to be just, he ... has to reinterpret the history of precedents in terms of
the new factors in the present context."); Francis J. Mootz III, The Ontological Basis of Legal
Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and
Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 523, 542 (1988) ("An interpretive appropriation of a text further deve-
lops the tradition that grips the interpreter.").
118. David Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/Nonoriginalism
Distinction, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 479, 497 (1988).
119. See Mootz, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 541-42 (cited in note 117) CThe normative content of a
statute or constitution is revealed only when the horizon of a situated interpreter confronts the
effective-history of the legal text.").
120. Hoy writes:
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Application of the tradition of a constitutional provision in a
present case does not require that an "objective" principle be articu-
lated prior to consideration of the present case, even if such a thing
were possible. Given the nature of legal reasoning and the current
state of constitutional scholarship, abstract principals may well-in
fact, will usually-be the vehicle lawyers and judges use to establish
connections between legal past and present. Nevertheless, such prin-
ciples are not formulated prior to their application in the present case,
but only for the sake of the present case, and they are always refor-
mulated for the sake of application in every subsequent case. In other
words, although we can induce general principles that account for
decisions in past cases, such principles cannot control the next case,
because the next case always functions to alter the principle. In
short, a priori principles have no vitality outside of the case or cases
in which they are applied and for whose sake they are formulated.
Both Bork and Perry illustrate this phenomenon. Bork strives
mightily to show how Brown v. Board of Education could have been
decided in a manner consistent with the original understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause. Conceding that the ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment saw no contradiction between equality and
segregation, Bork argues that by the time Brown came up for
decision, it had long been apparent that segregation could not produce
equality.121 Endless litigation over the inequality of innumerable
separate but allegedly equal facilities now loomed before the Court. 122
Whatever might have been the possibilities in theory, Bork argues, in
practice "equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent,"
although "the ratifiers did not understand that."123 According to Bork,
the only two realistic courses open to the Court were to abandon the
quest for equality, or to abandon the separate-but-equal doctrine.
Both choices were inconsistent with the original understanding but
the latter choice, Bork maintains, was less inconsistent and thus
The connectedness of tradition explains an important reason why we still find the
original text authoritative in our present context, despite differences from the original
context. That we feel that the constitutional provisions are still very much present law
suggests that we understand ourselves as having a single tradition (however complex
and polysemous), stretching back and including the context in which the provisions were
first written down and ratified. In understanding the law we are really trying to
understand ourselves, and the tradition of legal interpretation and judicial practice is an
important part of what we have become.
Hoy, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. at 497 (cited in note 118).
121. Bork, Tempting of America at 82 (cited in note 17).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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preferable. 124  In short, Bork contends that the ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment misunderstood the practical implications of
the principle of equality. Because it is the principle that binds, and
not the ratifiers' subjective understanding of that principle, 125 Bork
concludes that originalism justifies contemporary courts when they
apply it in a manner strongly objectionable to the ratifiers.
Bork's "originalist" defense of Brown is weak. First, Bork
insists with respect to other constitutional texts that when the origi-
nal understanding of a text is unknown, judges are not justified in
interpreting the text according to their best lights, but instead must
abstain from adjudicating at all under the authority of the text. 126
Abstention would likewise seem to be appropriate in the analogous
situation when the original understanding of a text is known but
incoherent. Since for Bork it is the original understanding that con-
strains judges from deciding on the basis of their personal values, it
follows that deciding a case on the basis of one of two contradictory
concepts that both form part of the original understanding can only be
done on the basis of the judge's personal values. 27 Why, for example,
must the Court have chosen equality over segregation in Brown?
Though there are obvious answers to this question, none of them is
originalist. 28
Even more importantly, Bork can maintain that the ratifiers
erroneously believed that the practice of segregation was consistent
with the principle of equality, only if the principle of equality is ar-
ticulated very abstractly, as it was in Brown-that is, at a very high
level of generality, like "separate but equal is inherently unequal."
Bork himself claims that the original understanding of a constitu-
tional text should be articulated only at that level of generality justi-
fied by constitutional language, structure, and history. 29 Given that
the ratifiers clearly did not think they were outlawing state-mandated
segregation by ratifying the Equal Protection Clause, Bork's own
124. Id.
125. See note 21 and accompanying text.
126. Bork, Tempting of America at 166-67 (cited in note 17). See, for example, id. at 166
(suggesting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is like "a
provision that is written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot. No judge
is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the ground that there must be something under it."); id. at
183 ("There is almost no history that would indicate what the ninth amendment was intended to
accomplish. But nothing about it suggests that it is a warrant for judges to create constitutional
rights not mentioned in the Constitution.").
127. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
128. For a more sophisticated originalist defense of Brown, see Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995).
129. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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methodology requires that the original understanding of the principle
of equality be articulated at a level of generality that accommodates
this practice. Such an equality principle is hardly unimaginable;
there is evidence that many of the ratifiers intended that the clause
ensure the "legal" but not the "political" or "social" equality of the
newly freed slaves.130 In other words, the clause was intended to
protect the rights of African Americans, say, to hold title to property,
to sue on contracts, and to receive criminal due process, but was not
meant to protect a right to vote in state elections or a right to marry
outside of their race. 131 This conception of equality as confined to a
limited set of common law rights is perfectly consistent with govern-
ment mechanisms of social segregation and discrimination deployed
in both the South and North prior to Brown. It could not, therefore,
account for the result in Brown itself.
It is difficult to believe that Bork's strained effort to defend
Brown on originalist grounds is unrelated to the fact that Brown has
come to be viewed as one of the great Supreme Court decisions of the
twentieth century.132 The legitimacy of any constitutional theory now
depends, at least in part, on whether it can accommodate the holding
in Brown. As Bork himself acknowledges:
The end of state-mandated segregation was the greatest moral triumph consti-
tutional law had ever produced. It is not surprising that academic lawyers
were unwilling to give it up; it had to be right. Thus, Brown has become the
high ground of constitutional theory. Theorists of all persuasions seek to cap-
ture it, because any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psycho-
logical fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.13'
Though Bork maintains that the ability of originalism to ac-
count for Brown is irrelevant to its validity as an interpretive meth-
odology, his concoction of a barely credible originalist account of
Brown belies this assertion. A Gadamerian explanation is more plau-
sible. As Bork acknowledges, Brown has entered the constitutional
tradition that connects the original understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause to any application of that understanding in con-
temporary situations. Even an originalist as committed as Bork must
account for it. Thus, Bork himself proves that one cannot simply pick
130. See, for example, Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking 241-43 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1992) (noting that "suffrage was intentionally
excluded from the rights that the fourteenth amendment [was] to guarantee" because "[1]egal
thinkers defined suffrage as a political privilege").
131. Id. at 230-35.
132. Bork, Tempting of America at 74-81 (cited in note 17).
133. Id. at 77.
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up the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause from
1868 and drop it into 1997 as the major premise in a constitutional
syllogism; 134 rather, the expectations of meaning that attached to the
clause after Brown unavoidably affect how the original understanding
is understood in any contemporary post-Brown situation. 135 The
original understanding of equality continues to affect adjudication of
contemporary cases, but contemporary cases like Brown have just as
clearly affected the original understanding of equality.
Perry "interprets" the directive of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as follows:
First, the directive forbids states to enact or enforce laws that deny protected
privileges or immunities to a group ... on the ground that the members of the
group are inferior, as human beings, to persons not members of the group, if
the group is defined, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of a trait irrelevant to their
status as human beings.
Second, the directive also forbids states to enact or enforce laws that deny
protected privileges or immunities to a group on the basis of hostility towards
the members of a group, if the group is defined, explicitly or implicitly, in terms
of an activity, a way of life, or a set of beliefs... towards which no state may, as
a constitutional matter, express hostility.136
In Perry's interpretive procedure, this directive stands as the mean-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause. Perry subsequently "specifies" it
in the context of various government actions to determine whether
such actions violate the Equal Protection Clause. In Perry's interpre-
tive scheme, however, this directive would remain the meaning of the
clause irrespective of whether these subsequent specifications were
made or not. Perry has not formulated this directive in the abstract,
134. Bork states:
[A]l that a judge committed to original understanding requires is that the text,
structure, and history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a
major premise. That major premise is a principle or stated value that the ratifiers
wanted to protect against hostile legislation or executive action. The judge must then
see whether that principle or value is threatened by the statute or action challenged in
the case before him. The answer to that question provides his minor premise, and the
conclusion follows. It does not follow without difficulty ....
Id. at 162-63.
135. Gadamer writes:
Of course, the reader before whose eyes the great book of world history simply lies open
does not exist. But neither does the reader exist who, when he has his text before him,
simply reads what is there. Rather, all reading involves application, so that a person
reading a text is himself part of the meaning he apprehends. He belongs to the text that
he is reading.
Gadamer, Truth and Method at 340 (cited in note 10).
136. Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 130-31 (cited in note 4).
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but for the sake of a question he candidly admits: How can the his-
tory of the Equal Protection Clause plausibly be interpreted so as to
preserve and extend broad, progressive readings of the
clause-namely, to avoid a declaration that affirmative action on
behalf of racial and ethnic minorities is unconstitutional, and to pro-
vide broad protection to individuals from government discrimination
on the basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation?' 37 The history of
the Equal Protection Clause yields Perry's directive because of the
question he puts to that history. A different question, such as, "How
can the history of the Equal Protection Clause be interpreted so as to
minimize judicial discretion?," as Judge Bork might formulate it,
would undoubtedly yield a different directive.138 Perry's
"interpretation" of the clause adds nothing that would not have
emerged in his application of the history of the Equal Protection
Clause directly to his question.
Perry's treatment of the Ninth Amendment is another exam-
ple. Perry argues that although this amendment "does not state that
the people have other unenumerated constitutional rights... [,] it
does, on any plausible reading, presuppose that they do."' 39 Noting
that the Tenth Amendment by its terms confirms that the newly
formed federal government was one of limited and specifically dele-
gated powers, Perry seeks to buttress this reading of the Ninth
Amendment by asserting that "[ilt is difficult to see.., the point of a
Ninth Amendment that does only what the Tenth Amendment does
and nothing more."14o In the eighteenth century, however, many of
the Framers saw little difference between protecting individual lib-
erty against federal encroachment through affirmative restrictions on
the federal government's powers like the Bill of Rights, and protecting
such liberty by limiting the powers delegated to the federal govern-
ment.'4' It is "difficult to see" the Ninth Amendment as something
137. Compare id. at 55 ("[The originalist approach is not necessarily inconsistent with a
judicial role as large or as active as any apostle of'the Warren Coure (I count myself one) could
reasonably want."), with id. at 143-49 (defending Brown v. Board of Education, Bolling v.
Sharpe, and strict scrutiny of racial classifications); id. at 149-53 (defending heightened scrutiny
of gender classifications); id. at 155-60 (arguing that affirmative action programs should not be
subjected to more than rational basis scrutiny); id. at 175-79 (arguing that classifications based
on same-sex orientation violate the antidiscrimination directive of the Equal Protection Clause).
138. See Bork, Tempting of America at 37-39 (cited in note 17) (endorsing the narrow
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment set forth in The Slaughterhouse Cases because a broader
reading would give the Court unrestrained power to enact public policy).
139. Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 63 (cited in note 4).
140. Id. at 65.
141. See, for example, Brest and Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking at
110 (cited in note 130) ('Neither Wilson nor Madison seemed to draw a sharp line between
restricting the powers of the national government and protecting individual liberties."); Steven
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other than a constitutionalization of unenumerated rights only be-
cause in the intervening years the limited powers doctrine has wholly
failed as a means of protecting individual liberty against government,
having been replaced by enforcement of the affirmative individual
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.142 Without this history, the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments could be understood as complementary
jurisdictional statements, together confirming that the states retained
sovereign power over individual common law and state constitutional
rights not enumerated in the Constitution, and that the federal gov-
ernment could exercise sovereign power only over those matters
expressly delegated to it by the Constitution.143
VI. THE ROMANTIC QUEST FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL CERTAINTY
The contemporary need to separate the cognitive from the
normative in constitutional interpretation stems from the same need
for epistemological certainty that motivated the nineteenth century
Romantics to develop a "scientific" method of interpretation. If truth
and knowledge depend on the separation of the investigator from the
object of her investigation, then any demonstration that this separa-
tion has not occurred-that is, that "subjectivity" is present, meaning
that "objectivity" is not--disqualifies the results of the investigation
as knowledge, hence both Bork's and Perry's respective conclusions
that nonoriginalist interpretation is illegitimate. If one assumes a
distinction between "subjective" and "objective" meaning, then dem-
onstrating that a method does not yield "objective" meaning seems to
lead to interpretive relativism-no particular meaning is demonstra-
D. Smith, The Writing of the Constitution and the Writing on the Wall, 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol. 391, 394-400 (1996) (arguing that the Framers understood the Bill of Rights merely to have
made explicit the rights-protection motivation for separation of powers).
142. See Smith, 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. at 394-95 (cited in note 141).
143. See Bork, Tempting of America at 184-85 (cited in note 17) C'Both the ninth and tenth
amendments appear to be protections of the states and the people against the national govern-
ment."). John Ely calls this the "received" understanding of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
an understanding linked most closely with Justice Black. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at
34-36 (cited in note 3) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting)). Ely himself rejects this interpretation in favor of one which sees the Ninth
Amendment as a warrant for judicial identification of unenumerated constitutional rights. See
id. at 35, 38-41 ('[The conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was intended to signal the
existence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution is the only conclusion its language seems comfortably able to support."). For a
careful defense of the "received" understanding, see Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1215 (1990).
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bly more valid than any other-or interpretive nihilism-no valid
meaning exists at all.
Fear of relativism and nihilism motivates attempts to formu-
late originalist methods of interpretation that purport to be ideologi-
cally neutral and epistemologically reliable. As part of an originalist
methodology, a procedure like Perry's "interpretation" and Bork's
derivation, in which the "objective" cognitive meaning of a text is
sought to be articulated apart from the interpreter's "subjective"
normative concerns, usually seeks to ensure that the results of the
methodology will count as knowledge-that is, that there is some
"objective" basis for preferring the meaning of the text yielded by the
methodology over other possible meanings. Betti, for example, main-
tains that restricting textual meaning to what the author intended
provides a basis for distinguishing valid from invalid interpretations.
Without this control, he contends that meaning would be unavoidably
indeterminate, and that there would be no nonarbitrary way of select-
ing among competing interpretations.'" Bork represents this position
in extreme form, repeatedly insisting that if interpretation does not
proceed in the objective fashion purportedly guaranteed by the origi-
nal understanding, judges can make the Constitution mean anything
they want.45
Perry's originalism claims less than Bork's in the name of
"objective" knowledge, allocating a significant role to subjectivity in
both cognitive and normative constitutional interpretation. Perry
concedes, for example, that an originalist judge's conception of the
judicial role will often influence her determination of the intended
cognitive meaning of an opaque text-that is, a minimalist originalist
will tend to find most plausible an "interpretation" of the constitu-
tional text that tends to minimize judicial discretion, and vice versa
144. Betti, Teoria generale § 11 at 262-63, § 16 at 305-07 (cited in note 95); Palmer,
Hermeneutics at 58, 73, 79-81 (cited in note 95). Hoy states:
Some hermeneutical theorists, such as the Italian jurisprudent Emilio Betti or the
American literary critic E.D. Hirsch, follow an older tradition by distinguishing a first
operation, the cognitive act of understanding or explicating a text's meaning, from a
second, the normative interpretation of a texes significance. The second operation is
then distinguished in turn from a third, the reproductive application of that sense to a
specific situation, one that is similar in some respects but different in others. These
theorists insist that these operations are distinct from one another and maintain that
any attempt to conflate them will undermine the objectivity of understanding and lead
to relativism or nihilism.
Hoy, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 137 (cited in note 95).
145. See, for example, Bork, Tempting of America at 43, 81 (cited in note 17); Bork, 26 S.
Tex. L. Rev. at 387-88 (cited in note 21); Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare
Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 695, 696.
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for a judicial non-minimalist.146 In most cases a judge will not find
two competing meanings equally plausible, and in no case will a
minimalist judge be able to maintain the "objective" validity of her
"interpretation" against a competing "interpretation" preferred by a
non-minimaist. Similarly, a judge is likely to be predisposed to see
as most plausible that specification that comports with her personal
notions of political morality. 147
Still, Perry seeks to preserve at least a limited domain of objec-
tivity in his methodology. As his last chapter emphasizes, constitu-
tional interpretation for Perry is both "law and politics."'4 Perry's
account of interpretation is more nuanced than Bork's, but they share
a common premise: Validity in interpretation depends at some point
on a demonstration of objective meaning in the interpretive process.
Without this demonstration, interpretive method cannot designate as
valid one among differing interpretations without being random or
arbitrary.
Even without objectivity, however, it is not true that legal
meaning is arbitrary in the sense of being random or unpredictable.
Gadamer maintains that although the law cannot be understood out-
side of its particular applications, it is possible, at least in principal,
for one to be sufficiently familiar with the practice of law within a
particular legal tradition to be able to predict accurately how a law
will be applied in a particular situation by a judge operating within
that tradition149 By "legal certainty," 50 Gadamer means to suggest
146. Perry, Constitution in the Courts at 56-58, 82 (cited in note 4).
147. Id. at 61-62, 71-72, 82.
148. Id. at 192, 204.
149. Gadamer states:
It is part of the idea of the rule of law that the judge's judgment does not proceed from
an arbitrary and unpredictable decision, but from the just weighing up of the whole.
Anyone who has immersed himself in the particular situation is capable of undertaking
this just weighing-up. This is why in a state governed by law, there is legal
certainty-i.e., it is in principle possible to know what the exact situation is.
Gadamer, Truth and Method at 329 (cited in note 10). See also Mootz, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 567
(cited in note 117) ("Admittedly, there are tremendous communal ties that guarantee to some
extent that legal meaning will be intersubjective."). William Eskridge adds:
Application helps Gadamer avoid the objection of subjectivism because the jurises
dialogue with the text is rooted in an actual set of facts and a specific historical
moment.... For Gadamer, the jurises situatedness in society, her situatedness in a
particular case and her situatedness in a well-known tradition of laws and
interpretations, ensure "legal certainty" ...
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 635, 636
(1990). Joseph Singer gives an extended illustration of the predictability of American law
notwithstanding that legal doctrine is indeterminate. See Joseph William Singer, The Player
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L. J. 1, 19-25 (1984).
150. A better translation would be "legal security."
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only that a lawyer who knows the exact situation in which the law
will be applied, at least in theory, is able to give correct advice be-
cause the lawyer "can accurately predict the judge's decision on the
basis of existing laws."''51 This is not to suggest that one can speak of
the meaning of law apart from its particular applications, that
"objective" interpretation is possible. Rather, it means that, in a state
governed by law, legal meaning is not random, though it does not
exist as an abstract or universal entity apart from the applications in
which it occurs.
This explanation is unlikely to satisfy those, like Perry and
Bork, who are committed to some measure of "objectivity" in interpre-
tation. The problem lies in their premise that valid interpretation
depends at some point on method, with its division of subject from
object. From this it follows that any meaning resulting from a non-
methodological judgment by the interpreting subject cannot count as
the true meaning of the text (objective knowledge), but only as the
subject's belief about that meaning (subjective belief). If one proceeds
from the Heideggerian premise that subject and object are always
inseparably intertwined in relationships, however, then a demonstra-
tion that a methodology is not purely "objective," that the meaning it
yields is the result of prior relationships between subject and object,
does not disqualify such meaning as knowledge, but merely describes
how the text has come to be understood.152
This is precisely what Gadamer wishes to show in Truth and
Method. His purpose "is not to develop a procedure of understanding,
but to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place. But
these conditions are not of the nature of a 'procedure' or a method." 53
To the contrary, Truth and Method seeks to demonstrate that method
151. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 329-30 (cited in note 10).
152. Eskridge writes:
For Gadamer, neither the text nor the interpreter is the "objece' of interpretation; if
there be an object it would be the truth that is sought by both interpreter and text. It is
blinking reality to think that the text has a pre-existing meaning that one can retrieve
through any methodology. The interpreter, therefore, is not constrained by method.
She is, instead, constrained by precedent and the ongoing story of law, and by her good
faith dialogue with the text.
Eskridge, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 149).
153. Gadamer, Truth and Method at xiii (cited in note 10). Hoy states:
The best tack for hermeneutical philosophy... is not to start, as epistemology does, by
legislating a priori a method that any discipline must follow if it is to count as a rigorous
science. Instead, hermeneutics must take seriously the self-understanding of
practitioners of various disciplines, and scrutinize those particular disciplines to see how
understanding and interpretation really work.
Hoy, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 136-37 (cited in note 95).
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is an obstacle to truth, particularly in the human sciences.154 Thus, it
would be self-contradictory to make this demonstration
methodologically. 155 "If we accept Gadamer's claim, we do so because
we believe that Gadamer has accurately retrieved the interpretive
tradition most meaningful to us, or has told a story we find believable,
not because he has presented irrefutable arguments for his posi-
tion."156 There are certainly ways to distinguish valid from invalid
legal interpretations, but they are contingent and local, peculiar to
the case, the judge, and the tradition, and thus cannot be demon-
strated in rigorous and "objective" scientific fashion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Perry's separation of originalism from minimalism is a genuine
accomplishment. For years, political conservatives have occupied the
rhetorical high ground by arguing that originalism is the only ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation that preserves the "objective"
meaning of the Constitution and that enables judges to enforce the
Constitution without reading their own political/moral views into it.
Aligning oneself with objectivity is a familiar rhetorical move in mod-
ern American life; it installs one's own views as "truth"-knowledge
about the nature of the world that cannot be disputed-while mar-
ginalizing the views of those with whom one disagrees to the
contestable realms of subjectivity and irrationality. This move
enabled political conservatives to portray liberal judicial decisions as
not simply the consequence of good faith differences in political
philosophy, but as purposeful departures from the "rule of law"
dictated by the Constitution, a sort of liberal will to power. 57 By
methodologically separating originalism as interpretive methodology
from judicial restraint as political philosophy, Perry removes this
pseudo-epistemological prop to the conservative position. That a
judge may search for the meaning of the text at a more abstract level
154. Gadamer, Truth and Method at xxi-xxiii (cited in note 10).
155. Eskridge, 90 Colum. L. Rev. at 615 (cited in note 149).
156. Id.
157. See, for example, Bork, Tempting of America at 8 (cited in note 17) ("[Liberal theo-
rists] see the Constitution as a weapon in a class struggle about political and social values."); id.
at 136 ("The new theorists of constitutional law deserve to be better known than they are, not
because their theories are good but because, as a group, they are influential and their enterprise
involves nothing less than the subversion of the law's foundations. Some of them are quite
explicit about their intention to convert the Constitution from law to politics, and judges from
magistrates to politicians.").
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of generality or apply the text to a broader range of cases than
another judge does not make such a judge less originalist, merely less
minimalist. This centers the debate where it belongs: on differences
in one's political understanding of the Constitution.
15 8
Nevertheless, Perry's approach, like Bork's, is still methodo-
logical. Like the Romantics over a century before them, Perry and
Bork both proceed on the assumption that validity in interpretation
depends at some point on separating the interpreter from the textual
object being interpreted. To Gadamer's argument that this division of
understanding fundamentally misconceives how human beings relate
to the world, they respond inadequately or not at all. Certainly nei-
ther of them gives Truth and Method the sort of engaged, sustained
attention that a work of its stature demands. One may, and probably
should, question the usefulness of an interpretive methodology that
has not come to terms with those who contend that the method does
not reflect how human beings actually come to understand texts.
Accordingly, it remains very much in doubt whether originalism's
claims to certainty in interpretation can overcome the limitations of
the Romantic foundation on which they rest.
158. See Kay, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 285 (cited in note 3) ("The choice of following or reject-
ing the original intentions is necessarily not a legal choice, but a moral and political one. It
must be prior to law even-indeed especially-the law of the Constitution and is, in this sense,
preconstitutional.").
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